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A PROPOSAL FOR REBALANCING THE
DIGITAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN CONTENT
PROVIDERS AND INTERNET GATE-KEEPERS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 1976' granted copyright owners certain
rights, including, inter alia, the rights of distribution and
reproduction. These rights have historically been exercised
through traditional media conduits such as printed books, movies
and sound recordings. In the mid-80's authors began to recognize
the potential of digital technology as a media form that was
cheaper and easier to manipulate than the traditional media forms.
In this regard, authors found that through digital technology, they
could cheaply mass-produce copies of their material that were of
superior quality. During this same time period, authors also began
to recognize that the Internet was an economically efficient
conduit through which they could reach more consumers. In order
for consumers to be able to reach authors' material via the Internet,
these consumers had to be provided with a service known as
"connectivity." Connectivity was and is provided by Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs"). What authors are finding, however, is
that not only are digital publishing and the Internet cost efficient
and valuable tools for authors, but also they are also popular tools
used to infringe these authors' copyrights.
In response to the ensuing copyright infringement that began
taking place over the Internet, authors attempted to protect their
exclusive rights by filing claims against ISPs. These authors filed
suits against the ISPs because they recognized the futility of
personally attempting to detect each act of infringement across the
Internet. Following standard contributory and vicarious
infringement theories, the authors argued that the ISPs controlled
subscribers because "but-for" the ISPs the subscriber could not
infringe. The authors did meet limited success with these
1. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The Copyright Act of 1976 (as amended and codified) is
current through Pub. L. No. 107-272, approved October, 30, 2002.
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arguments, but any ground they gained was lost when Congress
enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") on
October 28, 1998. Congress felt ISPs had little defense against an
owner claiming copyright infringement, and enacted the DMCA to
protect the growth of the Internet.2
Current case law indicates that the effect of the DMCA has been
to impose on copyright owners the burden of attaching electronic
countermeasures to protect the rights that they have been granted
under traditional copyright law. Although it is not clear what
exactly the first Congress intended when creating traditional
copyright law, due to the closed nature of the committee meetings,
their ultimate aim, as interpreted by the courts, was to stimulate
artistic creativity.3 Currently however, authors are faced with new
obligations, such as the expense of detecting infringing uses on the
Internet and the expense of installing electronic countermeasures
for initial protection. These new obligations on copyright owners
are affirmative responses that developed with the digital
revolution.
Assuming copyright owners invoke DMCA provisions to get an
ISP to remove infringing material, that owner still has the initial
duty to inform the ISP of the infringement. This legal framework
leaves certain questions unresolved. More specifically, why can
2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was enacted on October 28, 1998,
during the dying days of the 105th Congress. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The DMCA
implemented the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and
Phonogram Treaty, which were signed by the United States in 1997. See
Clinton Statement on the Digital Millennium Copyright Ac4 U.S. Newswire,
Oct. 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13606936 ("The treaties will grant writers,
artists, and other creators of copyrighted material global protection from piracy
in the digital age.").
3. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.02 (2002) for a general explanation of the first Congress' legislative sessions.
See e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984), Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769
(quoting Mazer at 219), Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
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merely blocking access or removing infringing material suffice as
an end to the ISP's responsibilities when an infringer can easily
unsubscribe from one ISP and re-subscribe with another?
Moreover, the infringer can easily repost the infringing material
through the original ISP under a different account. Opponents of
the DMCA worry that it grants copyright owners the ability to
install fair use defeating electronic countermeasures, giving
copyright owners more rights than the Constitution granted.
Copyright owners, on the other hand, argue that they have been
forced to trade their right to exercise exclusive rights free from
costly electronic anti-infringement countermeasures, for broad and
unwieldy digital policing obligations.4
Recent statutes appear to have rectified the balance between
copyright owners, Internet service providers, and emerging digital
technology. In fact, however, something quite different is
occurring. Part II of this article provides background information
explaining (a) generally, how the Internet and ISPs work, (b) what
rights authors have under traditional copyright law and how pre-
DMCA case law applied that law in the face of emerging
technology, and (c) how courts now apply traditional copyright
law concepts under the DMCA. More specifically, this section
explains that pre-DMCA courts, in contrast to post-DMCA courts,
were likely to find that an ISP could be liable for contributory
infringement if it had some control beyond merely allowing access
to the Internet, provided that the infringing material was posted to
a discrete portion of the Internet. Part III explains that, despite
Congress' and even ISP's best efforts, copyright piracy on the
Internet continues to exist as a serious problem. Part IV suggests
as a solution that ISPs, rather than copyright owners, bear the costs
of implementing pre-screening electronic countermeasures, yet at
the same time retain only limited liability for infringing material
4. In fact, both those for the DMCA as well as those worried that the DMCA
grants copyright owners the ability to install fair use defeating electronic
countermeasures, are unwittingly on the same side- the former resists
expensive protective countermeasures, the latter resists tools that inhibit fair use.
See David Nimmer, Article: A Riff On Fair Use In The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673 (2000).
205
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that manages to pass through their servers. This solution
reinforces the partnership between ISPs and copyright owners that
Congress had intended.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Internet and ISPs: An Explanation.
The Internet is a conglomeration of computers all over the world
linked to a common network.' This network provides the
backbone for which content is stored and transferred to and from
computers attached to the Internet.6 The entry point to the content
is generally through ISPs, providing connectivity to the world-
wide-web.7 Usually for a flat monthly fee, users of ISPs receive a
software package, which enables the technical linkup with the ISP
and, subsequently, the Internet. Once equipped with the technical
facilities, the user connects to the ISP through a private log-on
name and password known only to the user and the ISP.8
One unique ability of ISP/user agreements that is not found in
similar agreements is the ease with which users can ISP-hop. ISP
5. See generally Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-
51 (1997) (describing the development and operation of the Internet); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same); PRESTON GRALLA, How THE INTERNET WORKS,
5-7 (Millenium ed. 1999) (same); DANIEL J. KURLAND, THE 'NET, THE WEB,
AND YOu, 25-29 (1996) (same); DAVE SPERLING, DAVE SPERLING'S INTERNET
GUIDE, 2-3 (2d ed. 1998) (same).
6. KEITH W. ROSS AND JIM KUROSE, WHAT IS THE INTERNET?, § 1.1 (2000),
http://www.postech.ac.kr/cse/hpc/research/webcache/book/overview/What is-t
heIntemet.htm (last visited February 27, 2003).
7. ISPs are sometimes referred to as IAPs (Internet Access Providers), the
only distinction being that ISPs offer more services than mere access (i.e.
connectivity). WEBOPEDIA: ONLINE DICTIONARY FOR COMPUTER AND
INTERNET TERMS (2003), at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/ISP.html (last
modified October 24, 2001).
8. For a more exhaustive list of ISP services see Rob Kolstad, Becoming an
Internet Service Provider, (Version 0.9.1), http://docs.rinet.ru:8083/becomelSP/
(last visited February 27, 2003).
206
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hopping occurs when a user cancels their agreement with one ISP
and subscribes through another. 9 Because most users access the
Internet through a toll-free dial-up number and because there are
thousands of ISPs from which to choose," a subscriber can easily
unsubscribe and re-subscribe an unlimited number of times. The
only real inconvenience to the subscriber would be a change in e-
mail address. If an ISP should cancel or block access to a user for
conduct that violates the ISP's policies, such as alleged copyright
infringement, the user can simply re-subscribe through another
ISP. Given that ISPs do not share information, a subscriber is free
to ISP-hop even if access was terminated for illegitimate behavior.
Once connected to the Internet, subscribers can, for example,
visit web sites, make purchases, browse for news and information,
join chat rooms, or track financial information." One particular
service millions find useful is Usenet. 2 Used daily by millions of
people around the world and containing more than 14,000
forums, 3 called newsgroups, Usenet is a worldwide bulletin board
system accessed via ISP connectivity to the Internet.' 4  Users
communicate by posting messages to Usenet. Totaling hundreds
of thousands of pages, messages range from simple text to
9. Standard industry procedure is to require users to commit to a period,
generally six months to a year, before they can discontinue the service. Even
this commitment has little persuasive effect because users can typically buy
their way out by paying a termination fee.
10. In February of 1996 there were 1,447 ISPs compared to 7,288 as of
March of 2001. Todd Judd Erickson, Introduction to the Directory of Internet
Service Providers, (13 TH Ed.),
http://www.ispworld.com/IspDirectories/Introduction.htm (last visited February
27, 2003).
11. For a more exhaustive list of ISP services see Rob Kolstad, Becoming an
Internet Service Provider, (Version 0.9.1), http://docs.rinet.ru:8083/becomelSP/
(last visited February 27, 2003).
12. WEBOPEDIA: ONLINE DICTIONARY FOR COMPUTER AND INTERNET TERMS
(2003), at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/U/USENET.html (last visited
February 27, 2003).
13. Id.
14. For a current discussion of Usenet in the courts see Ellison v. Robertson,
189 F. Supp. 2d 1051,1053-54 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
207
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extensive graphics.15 Some go so far as to include complete
reproductions of copyrighted music and books. With potentially
millions of users world wide accessing the Internet from millions
of connection points, tracking infringers is clearly a daunting and
expensive task. 6
B. Traditional Copyright Law and Pre-DMCA Case Law
1. Traditional Copyright Law: An Authors' Exclusive Rights and
Limitations On Those Rights.
All copyright law emanates from the Constitution: "The
Congress shall have Power. . .To Promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the Exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."17 Subsequent acts have, pursuant to this
constitutional power, elaborated on copyright ownership
definitions.18 For instance, Congress created the 1976 Copyright
Act. Congress intended the 1976 Copyright Act to balance public
access to creative works with an artist's right to control his or her
work during a specified term. 9 Under the Act, authors are granted
five exclusive rights. These rights are: (1) the right of
reproduction, (2) the right of adaptation, (3) the right of
distribution, (4) the right of performance, and (5) the right to
display.2"
An author claiming infringement of these rights must prove both
15. See Rob Kolstad, Becoming an Internet Service Provider, (Version
0.9.1), http://docs.rinet.ru:8083/becomelSP/ (last visited February 27, 2003).
16. See Nua Information Surveys, How Many Online?, at
http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how many online/index.html (last updated Nov.
2000) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (measuring Internet use as
of Sept. 2000).
17. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
18. Congress enacted the Copyright Act in 1909 and substantially amended it
in 1976 to grant the rights we have today.
19. Steward v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
20. 17 USCS § 101 (2003).
[Vol. X11I:203
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that he or she owns a valid copyright and that there was a violation
of one of the exclusive rights. 2' There are, however, limitations
imposed on a copyright owner's right of exclusivity. One such
limitation is abandonment. An alleged infringer that invokes
abandonment as a defense to a claim of infringement must show
that the copyright owner affirmatively did something that let the
public know it could freely copy.22 Another such limitation is fair
use. Examples of works that may be considered "fair use," and
thus not infringing works, are transformative works or derivative
works, such as parodies. 23 Therefore, while an author does have
certain rights of exclusivity, these rights are not absolute.
2. Pre-DMCA Court Decisions
In MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. ,24 the Ninth
21. Id.
22. Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, (9t' Cir. 1960),
cert. denied 365 U.S. 882 (1960) (holding mere lack of action [in affirmatively
protecting] is insufficient for a showing that a copyright owner has abandoned
any claim to exclusive rights.
23. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003). See also, Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, (1985) (noting that
"to negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged use 'should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work' (citation omitted)); Stewart v Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990)
(noting that fair use is a balance between creativity which is encouraged by the
Copyright Act and the protecting an author's work); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that a transformative albeit commercial
use can be a fair use).
Additionally, the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and
expression are also generally recognized as limitations. See I MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10 (2002) (discussing
First Amendment limitations on copyright). The limit is not clearly defined due
to a debate centered in part on whether the Copyright Act and First Amendment
stand on equal footing or whether the Copyright Act carves its rights out of the
First Amendment. Id. See also David Nimmer, Article: A Riff On Fair Use In
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673 (2000)
(discussing First Amendment and fair use considerations in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.)
24. 991 F.2d 511,518 (9th Cir. 1993).
209
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Circuit Court of Appeals held that a computer repair person who
was not authorized to use the computer owner's licensed operating
system software and who had merely turned on the computer was
liable for contributory infringement. At issue was whether an
unauthorized but temporary copying and loading of an operating
system into a computer's memory just long enough to check an
"error log" constituted infringement. 25  The defendant-infringer,
Peak, serviced computers that operated on plaintiff-MAI's
software.26  Peak copied the software into the computer's
temporary memory to facilitate diagnostic testing.27 The Ninth
Circuit held that although the copy was only temporary, it was
enough to infringe MAI's exclusive right to reproduction because,
(1) the copy was fixed, and (2) Peak could perceive the copy, i.e.
use the copy to diagnose computers. 28 Thus, while the copy was
only temporary, the court found for the copyright owner.29
In Religious Technology v. Netcom,3° the court found that an ISP
was not liable for infringing a copyright owner's rights to
reproduction or distribution. The court reasoned that access to the
bulletin board system that contained the published and
unpublished works of the founder of the Church of Scientology
could have been obtained through any Internet linked computer.3
Defendant-Netcom provided connectivity to the Internet for
subscribers who posted messages to a public forum called bulletin
boards.32 One such subscriber, a former employee of Religious
25. Id. at 518.
26. Id. at 513.
27. Id. at 518-519. The court found that although temporary once copied into
a computer's read-only memory ("RAM"), the copy was sufficiently fixed for
copyright purposes.
28. Id. at 519.
29. Id.
30. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See also, George Smirnoff III,
Note: Copyright on the Internet: A Critique of the White Paper's
Recommendation for Updating the Copyright Act and How the Courts Are
Already Filling In Its Most Important Shortcoming, On-line Service Provider
Liability, 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 197 (1996).
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Technology Center ("RTC"), posted RTC's copyrighted material
to vent about his former employer.33 Once the subscriber's
messages were posted to the bulletin board, Netcom would
automatically copy the messages to Usenet, which is a worldwide
forum available through any ISP. 34 The copies were propagated
across the world within hours due to Usenet's functionality.35 The
ISP did not monitor the subscriber's messages, much less control
their content.36 The court was faced with the issue of whether "the
large [ISP] that allows [the subscriber's messages] to reach the
Internet, should be liable for copyright infringement committed by
a subscriber.
37
The court found that Netcom was not contributorily liable
because it had neither knowledge nor control, which are the key
elements for finding contributory infringement.3" RTC alleged that
Netcom had control because it was capable of canceling messages
from Usenet.39 The court sided with the ISP and refused to impute
control over the infringing material from Netcom's mere ability to
delete messages.4" However, the court also noted that it would be
impractical to require a copyright owner to furnish proof of a valid
copyright each time a notice of infringement is sent to an ISP. " It
went on to add that it would be equally impractical to expect an
ISP to decipher infringement from other forms of copyright use
such as fair use.42 The court concluded by finding that Netcom
could be liable if an ISP's inability to assess fair use in light of
notice of valid registration was reasonable. The court also rejected
Religious Technology's vicarious liability argument because
Netcom was able to show it gained no financial benefit from the
33. Id.
34. See Ellison, at 1053-54.
35. Id. at 1367-68.
36. Id. at 1368.
37. Id. at 1367.
38. Id. at 1372-73.
39. Id. at 1375.
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subscriber's infringing postings.43
Another case challenging traditional copyright law is Marobie v.
National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors
("NAFED")." Defendant-NAFED was a website hosting service
that allowed an infringer to post unauthorized copies of Marobie's
copyrighted graphics on a website stored on NAFED's servers.45
Once posted, the unauthorized copies were available on the
Internet for distribution.46 Despite the fact the owner submitted no
evidence that the images had been downloaded, the court held that
NAFED violated the owner's right of distribution.47  The court
reasoned that it was enough that the images were available on the
Internet through a server attached to the Internet, regardless of
whether the images were actually downloaded. 48  Although the
defendant in Marobie was a website operator and not an ISP, the
same concept of liability for making available in the digital
domain is at issue.49
43. Id. at 1378.
44. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp.
1167 (N.D. II1. 1997).
45. Id. at 1172.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1174.
48. Id. at 1173-74.
49. Courts focus not on the type of service through which the public can
access the material, but on whether the material is available to the public.
Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act grants the exclusive right to "distribute
copies... to the public by sale or other transfer..." 17 U.S.C.A. 106(3) (1996 &
Supp. 1998). The test for infringement has three requirements: (a) distribution
of a copy: (b) distribution to the public: (c) distribution by some "transfer of
ownership." Id. Although. the Copyright Act does not define distribution to the
public, courts have held merely making copyrighted works available through the
Internet is enough. See Playboy Enterprises. Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552,
1555-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding a BBS operator liable for infringement of the
public distribution right for the making of photographs available through the
BBS.); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing Inc.. 939 F.Supp.
1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding the court ruled that uploading copyrighted
pictorial images onto a computer in Italy which could be accessed by users in
the United States constituted a public distribution in the United States.); Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. 503, 509, 513 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
212 [Vol. X111:203
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MAI, RTC, and Marobie demonstrate how the pre-DMCA courts
applied traditional copyright law to alleged digital copyright
infringements. Under these holdings, ISPs are not liable for
providing passive connectivity. However, they are liable for
contributory infringement if they have some control beyond
merely allowing access to the Internet, provided that the infrifiging
material was posted to a discrete portion of the Internet, such as
Usenet. Moreover, an infringer may be directly liable for merely
posting the material to the internet, regardless of whether the
material is actually accessed or viewed.
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act And Courts'Application
of It.
1. The DMCA
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to "facilitate the robust
development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
communications, research, development, and education."5  The
DMCA grants, inter alia, copyright infringement immunity to ISPs
if certain conditions are met. In this regard, in order for an ISP to
be protected by the DMCA's safe harbor provision it must (a) not
have actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement, (b) not
financially benefit from the infringing activity, and (c) act
promptly upon notice of infringing material to remove, or prevent
access to, the infringing material.5
With the explosion of the Internet, the traditional copyright
considerations gained a new depth. How would the Internet's
growth be protected without shorting copyright owners' exclusive
rights? Under the traditional tort theory of contributory
infringement the two key elements of knowledge and ability to
control could be stretched to hold ISPs liable. Congress, however,
(holding operators of a BBS directly liable for infringement of the public
distribution right by virtue of making available photographs.).
50. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 1, 10 5th Congress, 2d Session 1998.
51. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512.
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felt this would have negative consequences, and in particular was
concerned that the Internet would not remain an inexpensive
medium of expression. 2 Accordingly, the danger might be that
ISPs may pass along the cost of infringement, or rather the cost of
protecting themselves against subscribers who might infringe, to
all subscribers through increased access fees. Recognizing that
ISPs faced liability from copyright owners asserting their
exclusive rights in digital media, Congress enacted the DMCA 3
Congress "recognized that there are different degrees of on-line
copyright infringement, from the inadvertent and noncommercial,
to the willful and commercial."54 However, their intent was also to
encourage ISPs to partner with copyright owners "by suggesting
that a provider must investigate possible infringements, monitor its
service, or make difficult judgments as to whether conduct is or is
not infringing."55 To balance this, Congress refused to allow ISPs
the ability to claim ignorance of infringing conduct by stating:
"However, those who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their access to
the Internet through disrespect for the intellectual property rights
of others should know that there is a realistic threat of losing that
52. Service providers, as deep pockets, are natural targets for copyright
litigation. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade,
and Consumer Protection, Serial No. 105-102 (June 5, 1998), at 41 (statement
of Business Software Alliance). Presumably the ISP industry is the "party best
able to shoulder [the burden of copyright infringement]." WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 495 (4th ed. 1971). See also I. Trotter
Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace ", 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 993,
1044 (1994) (arguing that imposing strict liability on ISPs will make them
internalize the social costs of wrongdoing and adjust the scope of their activity
accordingly).
53. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998). Congress explained that the
DMCA "preserves strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners
to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in
the digital networked environment" while also providing "greater certainty to
service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may
occur in the course of their activities." Id.
54. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1176
(quoting H.R. Rep. 105-551(11), at 61); S. Rep. 105-190, at 62.
55. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. 105-551(11), at 61; S. Rep. 105-190, at 62 (same).
214 [Vol. XIII203
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access."
56
Although congress did not impose an affirmative duty on service
providers to hunt out infringers, copyright holders can investigate
potentially infringing activities and notify providers under Section
512(i) of the DMCA.57 Courts have recognized that the DMCA
allows for court orders terminating user accounts, but the DMCA
also imposes strong incentives to work with copyright owners. 8
The possible loss of safe harbor under the DMCA and subsequent
unlimited liability to copyright owners was meant to encourage
ISPs to self regulate and in essence work with copyright owners,
and together protect the Internet's intellectual property. 9
With the advent of the Internet, and ISPs as the entity
controlling the gates to the Internet, the legal minds at the time
were (and are) faced with how to apply existing law to new
technology. Until the late 80's and early 90's, plaintiffs were able
to have limited success alleging traditional theories of copyright
infringement, (i.e. direct infringement, contributory infringement,
or vicarious infringement).6" Under a theory of contributory
infringement, the copyright owner had to show that the defendant
had knowledge of the infringing activity and materially growth,
have had far contributed to or had control over another's infringing
56. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. 105-551(11), at 61; S. Rep. 105-190, at 62 ("a
service provider need not monitor its service or affirmatively seek facts
indicating infringing activity (except to the extent consistent with a standard
technical measure complying with new subsection [i]));" H.R. Rep. 105-551(11),
at 53.
57. Id. at 1177 (applying the DMCA to a website operator).
58. Id. at 1178.
59. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A).
60. See generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 13 (2002). For current applications see Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9 th Cir. Cal. 1996); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004 (9" Cir. Cal. 2001); Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051
(C.D. Cal. 2002); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 747 (D.
Md. 2001); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Marobie-Fl., Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip.
Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. I11. 1997).
13
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conduct.6" Contributory infringement was particularly valuable to
a these plaintiffs, because it allowed a 'but-for' analysis where one
could be liable for the acts of another if the former had control
over the latter's conduct. Plaintiffs alleged that infringers would
not be able to infringe were it not for the ISPs providing the
access. The central issues were whether the ISP had knowledge of
the infringing acts and whether the ISP could control the infringing
acts.
Prior to the DMCA, issues revolved around whether knowledge
could be imputed from the act of providing connectivity to the
Internet. Against the wishes of copyright owners, Congress chose
to accept the ISP's argument that the Internet is too vast to hold
them accountable for merely providing connectivity.6" Under the
DMCA, ISPs must have actual knowledge of the infringement and
receive financial benefit.63 In this regard, an ISP will not be found
to have financially benefited merely because it charges the user a
flat rate.' Upon receiving notice from the copyright owner that
the ISP is hosting a subscriber's infringing material, by hosting the
infringer's website or allowing the infringer to download
copyrighted music files, the DMCA requires the ISP to notify the
allegedly infringing subscriber that they will be blocked unless the
subscriber can justify the infringement.65 The subscriber then has
ten days to respond.66 Affirmative defenses, such as fair use, can
be raised at that time.67 If the subscriber does not respond, the ISP
61. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
62. Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
63. Id. at 1057-58.
64. Id.at 1059.
65. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 620 (4th Cir.
2001). See also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12B.07(B) (2002).
66. Id.
67. Presuming the process tracks the statutorily prescribed notices, proper
initial notice to the ISP pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3), subsequent notice to
the subscriber pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A), and finally counter-
notification from the subscriber pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 51 2 (g)(3), both the
copyright owner and the alleged infringer have the other's identity, and the
[Vol. XIII:203
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can remove the infringing material from the Internet, block the
web site or newsgroup which contains the material, or completely
block the infringing subscriber's access.6" This assumes, however,
that the ISP can identify the subscriber in the first place. Finally,
should the user respond to the ISP's notice, the only duty that the
ISP has is to notify the copyright owner of the identity of the
subscriber. At this point, the ISP removes itself from the
controversy. The copyright owner now knows the identity of the
infringer and can protect his or her rights by bringing a direct
action against the infringer. Under this legal framework, the ISP is
free to remain in the background despite the fact that the infringing
material has likely been copied or distributed many times over
across the Internet.
Once copyright owners know who the infringers are and the
material is taken down, an infringer may not be done. The
infringer can subscribe with a second ISP. While the infringer's
access to the Internet or the infringing material is blocked, the
second ISP will have no knowledge the of the infringer's past
transgressions. The extent of this problem is illustrated by the fact
that up to one million full-length movies are currently downloaded
every day, and that number is expected to increase dramatically as
technology makes motion picture piracy easier.69 Congressional
efforts, which facilitate reaching consequences, such as the
parties can proceed to court to have their controversy adjudicated. For a general
outline of the process see I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, § 12B.07(B) (2002).
68. In Ellison, AOL blocked all its subscribers from accessing the
newsgroup, not just the Ellison. While not within the scope of this article, the
concept of security and privacy for subscribers free an ISP's watchful eye
should not be a natural consequence of imposition of ISP policing. Andy
Harmon, Worries About Big Brother at America Online, The New York Times,
January 31, 1999.
69. See Michael Bartlett, Pirated Movies Abound on the Web, Wash. Post
(Aug. 1, 2001), available at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/168593.html
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (remarking that just one of many
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explosion of the piracy market.7" Furthermore, whereas in the
cassette example below the infringing copies had to be imported
across physical boundaries, digital transfer is invisible.7'
By shifting the burden and expense for detecting infringement to
copyright owners, Congress intended ISPs and copyright owners to
work together. Congress granted ISPs an out, if they cooperate
with copyright owners to detect copyright infringements in the
digital medium.
7 2
Congress anticipated that the next logical step would be
copyright owners protecting their works through technical
countermeasures. With this in mind, Congress added to the
DMCA stiff penalties for circumventing any countermeasure a
copyright owner uses to protect access or another exclusive right
granted under the Copyright Act.73 Owners can install devices on
their digital works that prevent all infringement, with some
exceptions reserved for fair use allowances. Since the practical
limitations to unauthorized reproduction or distribution are not
available in the digital medium, "4 owners either self-protect their
works or track down the infringement and initiate action against
the infringer.
2. Courts'Application of the DMCA.
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc.,75 plaintiff-Perfect
10 claimed that the operator of an online age verification service
was liable for contributory infringement of its copyright. At issue
was Cybernet's contributory infringement for the unauthorized
70. Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), Anti-Piracy, at
http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy (last visited Sept. 16, 2001) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer) (Despite launching over 60,000 investigations into
pirate activities in 2000 alone, piracy is growing).
71. See infra note 104.
72. 144 Cong. Rec. H10,048, H10,067 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (Conference
Report on H.R. 2281, Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
73. See generallv 17 USC § 1201.
74. See infra note 104.
75. 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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posting of copyrighted photographs on the subscriber's website.76
A website operator utilized the defendant-Cybemet's age
verification service to ensure visitors to its site were of legal age.
Cybernet provided the operator a service whereby visitors to the
website were first sent to Cybernet and upon approval were
allowed to view pornographic images.77 At some point the
operator made unauthorized reproductions of images from Perfect
10's website and posted them as their own." Upon detecting the
unauthorized images, Perfect 10 sued the website and Cybemet
alleging the age verification service could be held liable for the
web site's unauthorized reproduction and distribution of Perfect
1 O's copyrighted photographs.79
As part of Cybernet's service, it would review and verify sites
seeking its services.8" Verification consisted of analyzing the
material to ensure the content was proper.81 Cybernet made a
DMCA-like argument, claiming that plaintiff-Perfect 10 had failed
to allege a valid claim of copyright infrigment, that [Perfect 10]
had failed to identity "every copyright relied on, every individual
image in the magazines that is being infringed, every image on
specific web pages that does infringe, or the dates of any
infringement."82  Although actual knowledge was disputed, the
court found that because of Cybernet's review process, it had
constructive knowledge.83 Of particular importance to the court
was the fact that copyright owner notified the service of the
"potential for copyright infringement" as well as the fact that the
service reviewed potential sites seeking the service.84  Thus
76. Id. at 1117-18.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1120.
80. Id. at 1118-19.
81. 167 F.Supp.2d at 1118-19.
82. Id. at 1120. While Perfect 10 is alleging direct copyright infringement,
we can note the effect of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The DMCA
has set out notice requirements for copyright owners that compare to the those
in Cybernet. See infra note 16.
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Cybemet could not escape liability for doing little more than
verifying the age of subscribers who accesses a web site.85
The principle distilled from Cybernet is a requirement that
defendants must actively engage in one of the prohibited activities
recognized in the Copyright Act. In this case we see the court's
acceptance of a constructive knowledge argument in relation to a
web site service. In the future this could be helpful in holding
ISPs to some standard of accountability where circumstances can
be shown that the ISP should have known.
CoStar Group Inc., v. Loopnet Inc.86 was also decided under the
safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. Plaintiff-CoStar established
an Internet presence through its web-based commercial real estate
database and national commercial real estate information services.
CoStar would publish photographs of properties on its website as
part of its service to subscribers.87 Also a web site operator,
Defendant-LoopNet, allowed users to post commercial real estate
listings.88 CoStar sued claiming that many of the photographs on
LoopNet's site were infringements of CoStar's copyrighted
photographs.89 At issue was LoopNet's liability alleged to arise
from CoStar's notification of the infringing reproduction of
copyrighted photographs.9" The court found that Loopnet was a
service provider and that its activities qualified for the hosting safe
harbor provision because it did not have the right and ability to
control its users commensurate with the standard for vicarious
infringement.9" Again we see the importance courts give the
requirement for knowledge.92
85. Id.
86. 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001).
87. Id. at 691-92.
88. Id. at 692.
89. Id. at 695.
90. Id. at 705.
91. Id. at 701-704.
92. Extrapolating, if a website with close control over its content cannot be
held to have constructive knowledge of subscriber's activities, it stands to
reason that an ISP hosting hundreds or even thousands of such websites, would
help and encouragement from courts and Congress, as well as technical means
such as digital rights management software.
220
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In Ellison v. Robertson,93 an overzealous fan posted full the full
text of several copyrighted books to the popular newsgroup
"alt.binaries.e-book." The fan posted several books through his
messages, not as criticism or analysis, but as a tribute to their
authors.94 The messages were subsequently copied throughout
Usenet, including an ISP, which maintained Usenet as a service to
its subscribers.95 The ISP established a procedure that both
allowed for notification and informed subscribers that their
unauthorized messages could be deleted and their access blocked
by the ISP.96 After several failed attempts at notifying the ISP, the
owner sued the ISP.97 At issue was whether the ISP was liable for
direct, contributory or vicarious infringement.9" In addition, at
issue was whether the ISP was protected under the 'safe harbor'
provisions of the DMCA.99 The court found that the ISP had no
knowledge of, control over, or financial benefit from the fan's
messages.' Specifically, the court noted that the DMCA was not
intended to attach liability merely for the ability to block to
establish the element of control.' ° The court also noted that the
element of financial benefit was lacking because Usenet occupied
a very small percentage of the ISP's overall package of services.' 2
The service at issue requires a significant draw to subscribers, the
93. 189 F.Supp.2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
94. Id. at 1053.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. AOL established a workable notice procedure, which includes a
contact in which copyright owners are to submit their notice. Id. at 1057.
However, because technical glitches AOL did not receive Ellison's repeated e-
mails. Id. Thus, there was not actual knowledge. Id. The court refused to allow
AOL escaping, imputing constructive knowledge. The court noted that AOL
has "reason to know" based on the fact that AOL did not correct the technical
glitches in its system. Id.
98. 189 F.Supp.2dat 1056.
99. Id. at 1063.
100. Id at 1064.
101. Id. at 1061.
102. Id at 1062.
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reason they subscribe, not merely an afterthought service. 113
III. POST-DMCA COPYRIGHT OWNERS BEA R THE MASSIVE BURDEN
OF REMOVING INTERNET PIRACY AND C ONTINUING INTERNET
GROWTH.
The Internet is too large and individual user's acts too
insignificant in relation to the amount of information passing
through an ISP to allow a low standard of liability. ISPs go
beyond mere connectivity. When one considers that the content is
unavailable to most users without connectivity, ISPs are at the
same time a method for which society contracts, expresses, and
creates. To that end the means of posting articles, music, movies,
or criticisms for example develop the Internet if the ISPs allow it,
but their true value is recognized if protected. Copyright law is as
old as the Constitution; the Internet is only as old as the 70's. To
facilitate Internet growth, Congress essentially removed ISPs from
the detection mode.
In 1991, it took twelve counterfeiting operations, employing
hundreds of people, to manufacture approximately twenty-eight
million counterfeit cassette tapes."°  Today a single user can
accomplish the same on a computer connected to the Internet.1
0 5
Furthermore, in the cassette tape example the effects were not
exponential. In other words, it is doubtful that one who acquired
the counterfeit cassette tape would go to the same effort, ending
the trail of duplication.
The digital model is much different because it is difficult to
103. Id. at 1062, (noting that Usenet accounts for .25% of all services
available on AOL). Interestingly, the court failed to note that, whereas prior
courts had invalidated notice and take-down procedures (as mandated by the
DMCA) for the ease in which subscribers in those cases could unsubscribe and
re-subscribe, this court did not address this particular issue. This issue,
however, is crucial because a subscriber's ability to re-subscribe and re-post
infringing material results in authors receiving a very low degree of copyright
protection.
104. See Stephanie Brown, The No Electronic Theft Act: Stop Internet




DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 8
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss1/8
2003] REBALANCING THE DIGITAL PARTNERSHIP
detect the source. Due to the ease of digital copying, one copy
looks like the next and the next and so on, so that the same copy
that starts out posted to a website hosted in California could be
posted on a website in China later that same day. One user can
duplicate one file with equipment purchased for under $1000, post
the file to a web site or newsgroup, and it is instantly available to
literally hundreds of millions of users."°6
As mentioned above an ISP can block a user, but it does not end
there. ' 7 A copyright owner will be plagued by at least two
problems. First, if the blocked user so chooses, he/she can
subscribe through another of the thousands of ISPs and continue
posting the infringing material. While this creates some
inconvenience, it pales in comparison to the time, effort, and
expense involved in copying cassette tapes." 8 Second (depending
on whether or not the ISP merely blocks the infringing material or
identifies the infringer) they can simply create a new website and
post the infringing material to that site. Regardless of which re-
posting method the infringer uses, the copyright owner must now
reinitiate the search process and hope to detect the material.
These problems stem equally from copyright law, the emergence
of digital technology, and the DMCA. When it enacted the
DMCA Congress sought a balance between of equities and
prevention of ISPs from liability for mere connectivity.0 9
106. In fact courts have held merely making available on the Internet is
enough to infringe a copyright. See Marobie-Fl., Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire
Equip. Distribs., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11022 (N.D. I11. 2000).
107. This concept can be labeled ISP hopping. It is in essence similar to a
recent court decision holding that merely blocking a subscriber was not enough
if the subscriber could easily reapply. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d 1746, 1753 (2000). The ease in which subscribers' could
anonymously reapply meant that the on-line file-swapping service had not met
the DMCA §512(i)(A) "reasonable" implementation of a notice and takedown
policy. Id. See also Anne Hiaring, Copyright Infringement Issues on the
Internet, 617 PLI/PAT 455, 531 (2000).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05 (describing an example of a
cassette counterfeiting operation).
109. As previously discussed, Congress intent behind the DMCA was the
codification of the Netcom and other court holdings recognizing that ISPs
223
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However, through the clearing fog of digital liability, copyright
owners emerged with ALP. ALP is a burden born solely by
copyright owners requiring the implementation of electronic
countermeasures, sometimes referred to Digital Rights
Management Systems ("DRMs"), and costly search and detection
methods in an attempt to limit digital infringement. Furthermore,
whether the ALP itself is constitutional may be a concern until
adequately tested in courts.
Whereas prior to the digital revolution practical barriers
efficiently barred only the most ardent infringers, the emergence of
digital technology in facilitating cheap reproduction and
distribution has adversely affected costs of protecting these works.
Because the practical barriers were so inhibiting on infringers'
conduct owners could publish in any medium they chose. What
infringement existed had little impact on the owner's market.11°
Today, the picture is less clear. Owners are faced with affirmative
liability protection ("ALP") for both works they digitally publish,
as well as works they did not publish."1 '
IV. SOLUTION
To maintain Congress' intended spirit of cooperation, the
solution for the foregoing problems must preserve the rights of
copyright owners while not discouraging ISPs from acting as
passive conduits. This proposed solution does this. To be sure,
under the current legal framework an ISP may incur liability for
infringement carried on their system. However, the piracy
continues unabated, and instead of encouraging cooperation
needed protection for massive on-line infringement. See supra Part II.C.
110. Part of the frustration for on-line publishers, music as well as movie, is
the fact that the practical limitations to unauthorized reproduction and
distribution in existence prior to the emergence of digital technology have been
wiped away by digital technology. See supra Part 1II.
11. See Ellison at 1071 (holding that the ISP was not contributorily
infringing for merely providing the storage facilities in which its subscribers
could access the infringing material).
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between ISPs and copyright owners, copyright law has placed ISPs
between a place where any action to control could be used to
impute knowledge but failing to respond in the face of mounting
piracy has left copyright owners chasing millions of acts of
infringement one copy at a time.
DRMs are currently gaining acceptance. DRMs are electronic
countermeasures installed on an artist's work that notify the public
of important rights in the work. Additionally, DRMs can include
such information as: 1) the work's title; 2) its author; 3) its
copyright owner; 4) the name of a performer whose performance is
fixed in a work other than an audiovisual work; 5) the name of a
writer, performer, or director who is credited in the audiovisual
work; or 6) the duration or extent of use." 2 An author installs a
DRM to either restrict access to his or her work or to restrict the
work from unauthorized reproduction or distribution or both. An
owner can install a DRM that charges the user of a copyrighted
work a fee. They take many forms, which are beyond the scope of
this article, but understanding that they allow copyright owners to
install the same practical barriers that existed in our cassette
example above.
Opponents of DRMs argue that traditional copyright law is
ineffective with the new technology.'" The typical analogy goes
something like this. In the days before the digital revolution a
purchaser could buys a book to read and conceivably reads it as
many times as possible until the cover falls apart. The argument
goes that DRMs will never allow the book to fall apart because the
purchaser cannot afford to "pick" the book up that many times if
charged for each use. These prognosticators see only the demand
side, failing to realize two key developments in the digital world.
112. See generally 17 USCS § 1202. This provision generally allows for the
protection of these author-identifying features. See National Academy of
Sciences, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE, at 152-71, 282-303 (2000); Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Internet Digital Rights Management and Privacy Act (Apr. 16, 2001), at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/drm/#developers (last visited April 28, 2003).
113. Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1145
(2000).
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First, without evidence of demand killing pay-per-use, we won't
know whether the effect is to prevent reading. Secondly, it's likely
the same purchasers will purchase the real world book, preferring
to pay-per-use for limited purposes such as educational or
research.
Furthermore, in support of DRMs as a meaningful way to detect
and prevent massive infringement, we must re-consider the
copyright owner's economics which are inexplicably coupled with
the Internet. The copyright owners are by and large fueling the
content that drives the Internet. The massive size of the Internet is
demanding more and more content. The Copyright Act intended
to encourage creativity, but the Internet wants more; it wants
content, and it needs badly.
Finally DRMs are supported by the intent of other areas within
the DMCA itself. As Congress sought to afford copyright owners
new protections, it preserved certain limitation on exclusive rights
(e.g. fair) use, while allowing owners statutory protection granted
under 17 USC §1202, which provides for the right to not have
electronic countermeasures circumvented. Moreover, 17 USC
§ 1201 also prohibits the trafficking in any device that circumvents
DRvis. 114
Thus, copyrights must be protected, and the way to do this is by
providing a save haven. When copyright owners see the Internet
as a way to cheaply publish and distribute piracy will be the
furthest thing from their mind. DRMs therefore take on the urgent
function of driving the engine that promotes the growth of the
Internet.
Given that DRMs are effective ISPs can then safely assume the
duty of monitoring subscriber's for infringing uses of DRM
protected copyrights. Some opponents of making ISPs the Internet
police fear the impact of vesting too much power in a private
entity. These critics fear that because an ISP has no accountability
114. See also 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(1) (prohibiting the deletion of the
electronic information that may accompany a computer file containing a
copyrightable composition.), 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(1) (prohibiting the
distribution of copies or phonorecords [or books] from which the pertinent
copyright management information has been deleted or changed.).
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to any governmental entity the ISP will effectively adjudicate
constitutional issues without concern for such issues as Due
Process or the First Amendment. In fact, Congress considered this
very issue by enacting the DMCA when it added the proviso that
allows alleged infringers time to appeal an ISP's notice of take-
down. As opposed to making the ISP the arbiter, DRMs actually
make it easier for the ISPs to pin-point infringers and send notice
without extensive searching by the copyright owner. Furthermore,
given that the ISP has the capability to monitor a user's postings
(because all subscriber initiated information must pass through the
ISP) it is more economically efficient to have the ISP control the
infringing acts. In this way the costs of monitoring are spread over
a wider audience. Obviously, this spreading of costs would need
to be recalculated as piracy decreased.
ISPs will not have to monitor an overwhelming amount of
content because this solution only places an affirmative duty to
monitor and detect DRM protected works. Copyright owners will
actually see a benefit in the expensive DRMs because now instead
of futility, they will have assistance. Prior to placing a
responsibility on ISPs to detect for infringement, copyright owners
most likely viewed DRMs as a futile attempt at eliminating costly
Internet inspection. However, once ISPs are given the duty, and
freedom, to detect infringement of works that use DRMs,
copyright owners will be encouraged to use DRMs. Subsequently,
Internet content will improve both in quality and quantity as more
copyright owners publish in the digital medium.
Greg Adams
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